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This study explains why unions are winning 85% of certification elections in the
public sector compared to 48% in the private sector. Detailed information was gathered from
state labor boards and lead organizers for a sample of 181 public sector elections in 1991-92.
We assess the relative importance of employer background, labor-board practices and proce-
dures, bargaining-unit demographics, union tactics, and employer behavior on the certifica-
tion election win rate. By comparing these findings with Bronfenbrenner's earlier study of
private sector union campaigns (1993), we suggest that employer tactics playa primary role
in explaining the 37-percentage-point difference in public and private sector win rates.
r
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I~ Highlights of the study include:
r~1 .Overall, differences in employer background, board practices and procedures, bar-
gaining-unit demographics, and union tactics cannot account for the large difference
in win rates between the public and private sectors. In fact, these differences would
suggest that unions should be winning fewer elections in the public sector.nI'
[]
.Employers in the private sector utilize significantly more aggressive anti-union
campaigns than do their public sector counterparts and use a combination of legal and
illegal methods. In almost one quarter of all campaigns in the public sector, the
employer did not campaign at an against the union.
I
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. Private sector employers are six times more likely to commit unfair labor practices
such as discharges for union activity, and more than twice as likely to use other
tactics such as captive-audience meetings, employer leaflets and mailings, supervisor
one-on-ones, and illegal wage increases.
I
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. The formal and informal constraints on public employers create an environment
where workers are able to choose unions largely free from the coercion and intimida-
tion that is so pervasive in the private sector.
Ii
.These results suggest that the only way to curb aggressive employer behavior in the
private sector is through the significant expansion of union and worker rights in the
organizing process, coupled with more aggressive enforcement and stringent penalties
for employer violations.11
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An examination of union certification elections provides dramatic evidence of the
changing fortune of American trade unions over the past several decades. During the years
1965-69, on average 7,374 certification elections were held annually in the private sector,
with unions winning 59.9% of the elections each year. Over 300,000 new workers gained
union representation through these elections each year. By 1990 the number of union eJec-
tions had declined to 3,623. Unions won 49.5% of the elections in 1990, adding only 79,814
new members. Given the loss of membership through manufacturing decline, technological
change, work restructuring, and contracting out, it is clear that this level of organizing is not
sufficient to halt the continuing decline of the labor movement.
While there is little disagreement about the serious implications that declining organiz-
ing success has for American unions, there is considerable debate as to why these changes
have taken place. Some have seen these numbers as a clear indictment of the labor move-
ment-that unions are no longer relevant to a rapidly changing workforce in a constantly
changing world economy. Many trade unionists and academics, however, point to the explo-
sion of illegal and legal employer anti-union behavior as a major determinant of labor's
decline. Both of these perspectives have contributed to a growing public policy debate on the
labor movement, labor-management relations, and the possibility for labor-law reform.
What is striking about this debate is that it has focused almost exclusively on private
sector organizing. It has virtually ignored the tremendous growth of public sector employ-
ment and unionization over this same period. According to a new national database on public
sector organizing (Bronfenbrenner and luravich 1994), unions are winning 85% of certifica-
tion elections in state and local units. Clearly some very different dynamics are in operation
in the public sector. What accounts for these dramatic differences in the union win rates in
the public and private sectors?
This research is designed to answer this question through an intensive examination of a
national sample of public sector organizing campaigns. Through information gathered from
state labor-relations agencies and a survey of union organizers, we are able to create the first
detailed portrait of public sector organizing.
In addition to examining public sector organizing, we will compare this sample with a
similar sample of private sector certification eJections (Bronfenbrenner 1993). This in-depth
comparison will illustrate significant differences between public and private sector organiz-
ing and demonstrate that employer behavior is a primary determinant of why private sector
unions are faring so poorly in certification elections.
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Number of Union Win Average Unit Net Gain
Elections Rate Size*
Private Sector Certifications
(NLRB)
1991 3345 47% 61.3 76,749
1992 2949 49 67.8 73,977
1991-92 Total 6294 48 64.3 150,726
Public Sector Certifications
(State and Local LRBs)
1991 956 85% 58.3 44,911
1992 956 85 55.9 45,304
1991-92 Total 1912 85 57.1 90,215
*
Number of persons in bargaining unit.
Source: NLRB Reports 1991-92; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1994).
UNION CERTIFICATION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
I
I
I
I
Table 1 presents summary information on all certification elections in both the private
and public sectors for 1991 and 1992. In the private sector, approximately 3,000 certification
elections were held annually, with unions winning slightly less than half. Although approxi-
mately 190,000 eligible voters participated in these elections, ~helow win rate, especially in
larger units, resulted in unions winning representation rights for about 75,000 previously
unorganized workers each year (NLRB Reports 1991-92). In contrast, there were slightly less
than a thousand elections a year in the public sector, yet the 85% win rate added approxi-
mately 45,000 workers annually to those already covered by collective bargaining.
Table 2 provides a more detailed look at private sector elections during this same
period. Although more than a third of the NLRB elections were concentrated in manufactur-
ing industries, there were also a large number of elections in the service and retail sectors.
Win rates varied by industry, from a low of 34% in mining to above 50% in education, health
care, and other service sector industries. Despite this variation, win rates in all industries
remained below 60%, and hovered around 50% across all unit types.l
There has been a great deal of debate as to the factors contributing to this low win rate.
Some suggest that its root may be the changing view of unions by American workers (Farber
I
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TABLE 1
Summary of National Private and Public Sector Elections,
1991-92 I
I
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nr TABLE2
Characteristics of National Private Sector Certification Elections,
f' 1991-92
r Number in Number in Percent Wins1991 1992 1991-92
Industry
n
Manufacturing 1200 1074 40%
Transportation/Wareho use 436 419 45
Wholesale/Retail 577 501 40
r~ Communications 77 79 43
Utilities 116 135 41
Health Care 342 299 53
Education 26 28 55
Other Services 468 520 57
Hotel/Restaurant 68 56 44
Recreation/Ente rtain me nt 49 47 53
Bank/Finance/Real Estate 71 74 55
Mining 43 30 34
Construction 279 337 50
P
Unit
Production and Maintenance 1546 1196 48%
Craft 186 143 54
II
Cross Department 203 166 51
Guards 43 36 59
Professional/Technical 70 90 54
I'
Production/Maintenance/Clerical 15 19 50
Truck Drivers 536 403 44
White Collar/Office (Nonprofessional) 89 74 58
All Others* 244 206 52
Election Type
Consent 28 28 NA**
Ordered 527 576 NA
Ii
Stipulated 2739 2490 NA
Unit Size
1-9 676 676 60%
Ii 10-49 1550 1392 49
50-99 491 501 42
100-499 418 381 35
I 500-999 33 32 251,000-10,000 11 11 32
Total Elections 3179 2993 48
r
* Includes service and maintenance units.
**
Not available in NLRB annual reports.
I Source: NLRB Reports 1991-92.
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1987; Farber and Krueger 1993) . Using survey data, Farber suggests that "... much of the
decline in the unionization rate is due to a decrease in worker demand for union representa-
tion and that relatively little is due to increased employer resistance to unions" (Farber 1994,
2). Yet he asserts this relationship without even considering data on employer behavior, and
fails to consider fully that employer behavior can have a direct impact on public opinion.
Others suggest that it is aggressive anti..union behavior by employers during organizing
campaigns that have kept the win rates low, not the general attitudes of American workers
(Freeman 1988; Weiler 1983, 1990). There are numerous case studies that illustrate the
nature of employer anti-union tactics. Judy Ray's story about her attempt to organize a union
at Jordan Marsh is one example.
I
I
I
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I cannot impress upon you what an organizer, what an employee who is
just fighting for their rights in a campaign, goes through this day and age.
I wouldn't have believed it myself. I have been followed on my day off,
to restaurants, by security guards with walkie talkies. I had an employee,
a management person, assigned to work with me eight hours a day, five
days a week, who was told he was there solely to work on me, to change
.
my ideas about union. (Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations 1994, 89)
I
I
I
In another example, on July 14, at the culmination of a zealous union avoidance cam-
paign, Sprint Corporation fired the entire workforce at La Conexion Familiar, its
telemarketing operation for the Hispanic community in San Francisco, just eight days prior to
a scheduled National Labor Relations Board election. The NLRB complaint against Sprint
charged them with over 50 violations including threats, surveillance, interrogation, harass-
ment of union supporters, as well as the discharge of 235 workers without notice (NLRB
1994, 15-16).
The Industrial Union Department-AFL-CIO has compiled information from all its
affiliates on how employers use both illegal and legal tactics to destroy workers' organiza-
tions, fight unionization, and evade first contracts (Industrial Union Department 1994; Hurd
and Uehlein 1994). One of the cases it discusses is the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union drive at Surgical Appliance Inc. in Cincinnati.
I
I
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Nearly half of 120 employees were visited in their homes over two days
in early February 1993. Approximately 70 percent of those visited signed
union authorization cards. Eight workers passed out leaflets at the plant
gate the next morning. An hour later all eight were either laid off or had
their hours reduced. This scenario was repeated over the next few days
until twenty-six union supporters were laid off. The organizing campaign
had been stopped cold (Hurd and Uehlein 1994, 66-67).
J
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The difficulty of this case-study approach, however, is that it provides little information
on how widespread these practices are. The most common quantitative information used to
measure employer behavior is NLRB data on unfair labor practices. The research findings on
the impact of unfair labor practices (ULPs) on organizing, however, have been mixed.2
Freeman (1985), for example, suggests that from 1960 to 1980 the number of workers
fired by their employers for union activity and then reinstated by the NLRB rose five times.
Freeman goes on to suggest that these increases in ULPs led directly to the decline in the
union win rate. Similarly, Cooke suggests that ULPs reduce union win rates by as much as
10%. Others, however, such as Maranto and Fiorito (1987), and Lawler and West (1985),
contend that unfair labor practices can have a positive effect on organizing, tending to
crystalize workers' solidarity, which in turn backfires on the employer.
These contradictory findings reflect that charges of unfair labor practices are poor
indicators of employer behavior during the certification process. First, they capture only
reported illegal behavior by employers. In cases where illegal behavior destroyed a campaign
before it was viable, there may be no union left to file charges. Many union charges are also
lost or never filed because of the difficulty in supplying corroborating evidence and bringing
in supportive witnesses in a climate of fear and intimidation. Also, because penalties for
employers found to be committing unfair labor practices are inadequate and because ULP
charges can delay elections and first contracts for many months, if not years, unions are often
hesitant to file charges, even in the most egregious cases.
Furthermore, ULPs cannot capture the employer campaigns that, although technically
inside the law, stretch the law far beyond its original intention. For example, when the
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees attempted to organize
professional employees at Fountain Valley Regional Hospital in California in 1986, the
employer was able to use legal challenges and election objections to delay the election until
1987 and further delay certification until 1991 (Hurd and Uehlein 1994,24-26).
One of the few studies that went beyond ULP data to examine legal and illegal em-
ployer tactics was conducted by Bronfenbrenner (1994). Bronfenbrenner found that more
than 75% of employers studied engaged in aggressive anti-union tactics, including some
combination of discharge for union activity, captive audience meetings, supervisor one-on-
ones, promises of improvements, anti-union committees, leaflets, and letters. Most of these
tactics were associated with win rates 10-20% lower than in units where they were not
utilized. In addition, when included in a regression equation controlling for the influence of
election background, bargaining-unit demographics, and union-tactic variables, these indi-
vidual employer actions were found to decrease the probability that the union would win the
election by between 3% and 22%.
7
Our recently established national database of all state and local public sector certifica-
tion elections for 1991-92 in the 35 states that have some form of collective-bargaining
legislation provides additional insights into the impact of employer opposition in certification
elections. Table 3 provides an overview of these elections. What is surprising is the consis-
tency of win rates across a wide variety of entities, employers, bargaining units, and election
types. Unions won by substantial margins, receiving, on average, 83.2% of votes cast. De-
spite the high likelihood of union victory, the average election turnout was 87.7% in these
public sector campaigns (Bronfenbrenner and luravich 1994).
On a macro level, these data present a very different picture of the union election
process than the suggestion that workers are uninterested in organizing. In sharp contrast to
the private sector and some public opinion polling results, all types of public sector workers
are enthusiastically joining unions. What these data do not tell us is why.
As the Presidential Commission's Fact Finding Report suggests, "Union representa-
tives testified before the Commission that they believed an important reason was that public
employers seldom campaign against union organizing and that employees believe that if they
vote union the outcome will be a collective-bargaining contract" (Commission on the Future
of Worker-Management Relations 1994,77). The commission report continues, "Many
factors are undoubtedly at work behind these trends, including management actions, union
actions, government regulations, and the changing needs of workers and their assessment of
how best to meet those needs. The relative influence of these (and other) factors would be
very difficult to determine, including the significance of unfair labor practices" (1994, 77).
This research was designed with that challenge in mind. By providing a detailed exami-
nation of certification elections in the public sector, this study will assess the factors behind
the dramatic difference in win rates between the public and private sectors, focusing particu-
larly on the impact of employer behavior.
I
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UNION CERTIFICATION IN THE PuBLIC SECTOR
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ITABLE 3
I"'
Characteristics of State and Local Public Sector Certification Elections,
1991-92
Numberin Numberin Percent Wins
I 1991 1992 1991-92
Public Entity
State 32 28 88%
,...,,~
City 191 228 89
I County 193 182 81
Town 211 193 87
School District 229 236 85
Special District 58 56 78
Higher Education 42 33 81
Employer Division
All or Cross/Entity 144 154 89%
School District 229 236 85
Public Works 129 121 82
Courts 35 36 75
College/University 42 33 81
Social Services 65 57 72
Hospital 15 12 85
l"
Police 188 192 91
Fire/EMT 50 47 89
Administrative 32 36 75
Corrections 8 15 87
Ii Transit 19 17 86
Bargaining-UnitType
Clerical 55 50 80%
I:
Blue Collar 111 95 86
Support Staff 249 276 80
Security 6 10 88
I'
Technical 40 51 90
CombinedTech/Prof/Clerical 35 37 82
Professional 101 91 85
Wall-to-Wall 113 109 86
t Police/Fire 152 155 92Supervisory 94 82 86
Election Type
I"
Consent 655 623 85%
Stipulated 93 118 86
Ordered 150 178 87
I Unit Size1-9 335 310 88%10-49 444 453 85
50-99 94 105 81
I:
100-499 68 75 76
500-999 5 5 80
1,000-10,000 10 8 88
I
Total Elections 956 956 85
::-' Source: Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1994).
I
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This research is based on a random sample of single union certification elections in
units of 50 or larger. The sample of 250 elections was drawn from our database of all state
and local public sector elections held in 1991-92 in the 35 states that have some form of
collective bargaining (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1994).3A comparison of the sample with
the population indicates that this is a representative sample across states, units, unions, and
employers.
We gathered information on the elections from two different sources. First, we con-
tacted the appropriate state and local labor-relationsboard for each of the elections in our
sample to gather information on unfair labor practices committed by employers during
organizing campaigns. For each of the cases in our sample the appropriate state board pro-
vided us with documentation of all ULP charges filed during the election campaign, as well
as the disposition of each case.
.
We also gathered information from the lead organizer in each of the elections in our
sample through an extensive survey on union tactics, bargaining-unit demographics, and
employer behavior. This report is based on 181 survey responses, which represent a 77%
response rate.
A comparison of elections where we have survey responses with the total sample
indicates no bias in terms of geographical distribution, unit size, bargaining-unit type, or
public entity when compared to the total population of single union certification elections in
units over 50 in 1991-92. Table 4 describes the characteristics of the sample. As in the total
population, the elections are concentrated in professional and support-staff units in school
districts. There are also a significant number of campaigns in city- and county-wide blue-
collar, clerical, and wall-to-wall units. The overall win rate for the final sample of 181 elec-
tions was 70%. Although there is some variation in win rates across unit type, our final
sample, like the population of elections as a whole, shows consistently high win rates across
a broad range of public entities, election types, and unit sizes.
I
I
I
I
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Number of Elections Percent Wins 91-92
Year
1991 83 69%
1992 98 71
Public Entity
State 12 67%
City 32 84
County 32 63
Town 6 83
School District 72 64
Special District 10 80
Higher Education 17 76
Employer Division
All or Cross/Entity 32 84%
School District 72 64
Public Works 15 60
Courts 7 86
College/University 17 76
Social Services 14 50
Hospital 5 80
Police 4 100
Fire/EMT 4 100
Administrative 6 67
Corrections 3 67
Transit 2 50
Bargaining-UnitType
Clerical 17 82%
Blue Collar 11 90
Support Staff! Service Maintenance 76 59
Security 3 67
Technical 1 00
Combined Tech/Prof/Clerical 8 63
Professional 29 69
Wall-to-Wall 15 80
Police/Fire 9 89
Supervisory 12 92
Election Type
Consent 119 72%
Stipulated 14 57
Ordered 31 77
Unit Size
50-99 105 70%
100-499 67 69
500-999 1 100
1,000-10,000 8 88
Total Elections 181 70
Source: Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1994).
TABLE 4
Characteristics of Sample of State and Local Public Sector Certification Elections,
1991-92
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ELECTION BACKGROUND AND EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS
IN CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS
Perhaps the most obvious question facing those studying the differences in public and
private sector organizing success is whether this variation can simply be explained by
differences in the nature of the election process and the nature of public sector employment.
Table 5 provides some important background information on elections and employers in
both the private and public sectors by comparing the results from Bronfenbrenner's 1993
study of private sector campaignswith the public sector study. .
This comparison of the public and private sector data reveals some important and
largely unanticipated differences in election and employer characteristics. Given the fact that
public sector workers experience greater delay, are organizing into larger units, and tend to
have better pre-campaign benefits, one would expect less, rather than more organizing suc-
cess in the public sector. The data show otherwise.
In the private sector sample, the union won only 43% of the elections, receiving an
average of 47% of the votes cast in all elections and 65% of the votes cast in winning elec-
tions. In contrast, in the public sector sample, unions won 70% of the elections and received
66% of the votes cast in all elections and 75% in winning elections. In addition, more than a
quarter of the units where unions lost elections in the public sector went on to have a second
election within two years. Forty-three percent of those second elections were won by unions,
bringing the final win rate up to 75% of the total elections in the sample. Although the
second election win rate in the private sector was similar at 42%, only 7% of the units where
unions lost the election were involved in second elections.
Surprisingly, election delay (the number of days between the petition and the election)
and unit size, two of the many factors that make it more difficult for unions to organize in the
private sector, average much higher in the public sector than they do in NLRB election
campaigns. In NLRB elections, delay results from both NLRB caseloads and procedures as
well as employers purposely stalling elections through unit challenges and election objec-
tions. Based on our contacts in the state labor-relations agencies, it appears that the lengthy
delays in the public sector are less a product of employer opposition than they are due to
persistent problems in funding and staffing of public sector labor boards. In the private sector
the average unit size is nearly a thild lower in units where the union won the election than it
is overall. In the public sector the trend is reversed.
More than a third of the elections in the NLRB sample took place in units where the
same or other unions had lost a previous election. In the public sector only 18% of elections
occurred in units where there had been a previous union election. Unlike in the private sector,
the 72% win rate in these public sector elections was higher than it was in units where there
had not been a previous failed campaign.
12
Private Sector Public Sector
Sample Proportion Sample Proportion
Proportion or Mean Proportion or Mean
or Mean for Wins % Win Rate or Mean for Wins % Win Rate
Election Background
Election outcome .43 1.00 .43 (.00) .70 1.00 .70 (.00)
Percent union vote .47 .65 NA .66 .75 NA
Number of days between
petition and election 80 81 NA 154 126 NA
Number of eligible voters 138 105 NA 195 214 NA
Type of Election
v..> Previous election lost .35 .30 .38 (.45) .18 .16 .61 (.72)
Consent .48 .58 .49 (.36) .73 .73 .73 (.71)
Stipulated .31 .29 .40 (.25) .09 .07 .57 (.73)
Ordered .09 .07 .17(.45) .19 .20 .77 (.71)
Losses went to second election .07 NA .42 (.00) .26 NA .43 (.00)
Employer Characteristics
Pre-campaign health insurance provided .23 .23 .43 (.42) .74 .70 .66 (.80)
Pre-campaign pension provided .26 .21 .34 (.45) .71 .69 .68 (.75)
Pre-campaign employee involvement plan .07 .04 .22 (.44) .19 .19 .71 (.70)
Other units already organized .46 .52 .49 (.38) .77 .80 .73 (.60)
Note: Number in parentheses lists the percent win rate when the characteristic or tactic did not occur.
Source: Bronfenbrennerand Juravich(1994).
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TABLE 5
Election and Employer Background in Private and Public Sector
The information on the election process indicates that NLRB election campaigns are
much more likely to go through unit-determination hearings than are public sector elections.
Close to three quarters of the elections held in the public sector are consent elections, where
there is no employer opposition to the definition of the bargaining unit. Yet even in stipulated
and ordered elections in the public sector, win rates drop only slightly. In contrast, in the
private sector less than half of the elections are consent electi~ns, with win rates that hover
around 50%. In NLRB ordered elections the win rate drops sharply to 17%.
The employer characteristics presented in Table 5 suggest that public and private
workers find themselves in very different circumstances. In the private sector only one
quarter of the workers have any form of health insurance or pension plan, whereas in the
public sector over three quarters of the units have these benefits prior to the organizing drive.
Far fewer units in the private sector had a QWL (quality work life) or other type of labor-
management cooperative program. Yet the presence of these programs has a serious negative
effect in the private sector, while there is no perceptible impact evident in public sector
campaIgns.
Finally, in both the private and public sectors, the presence of other unionized units has
a positive impact on organizing. Given the higher union density in the public sector, it is not
surprising that more than three quarters of the campaigns occurred in workplaces where other
units were already organized, compared to only 46% in the private sector.
In examining employer characteristics, it is apparent that public sector workers find
themselves in significantly better circumstances in terms of benefits than do their private
sector counterparts. Given these working conditions, one would expect public sector workers
to have a much lower incentive to organize than do private sector workers, yet this is not
reflected in their respective win rates.
Overall, these findings suggest that ,employer characteristics and board practices and
procedures do not account for the differences in the win rates between the private and public
sectors. While there are some significant differences between state and local elections and
those supervised by the NLRB, they are neither in the anticipated direction nor in the correct
pattern to account for the immense variation in win rates.
14
BARGAINING- UNIT DEMOGRAPHICS
Another possible explanation for the differences in win rates in the public and
private sectors could be differences in the background and experience of the workers being
organized. Table 6 provides detailed information on the bargaining-unit demographics for
both the private and public sector samples. Once again the data point to important dif-
ferences between the two sectors. Workers involved in public sector organizing campaigns
are more likely to be white, higher paid, and working in professional occupations than
are workers organizing under the NLRB. Based on the private sector findings, these charac-
teristics should make public sector workers less likely to organize. Yet, in fact, the opposite
is true.
As we can see from Table 6, private sector unions appear to have their greatest success
in units where 60% or more of the unit are women or people of color. Private sector union
success is also highest with low-wage workers and in service and maintenance units. At the
same time the majority of NLRB elections are concentrated in blue-collar units, where the
average win rate is only 40%.
From these data it is clear that a very different distribution of women, minorities, and
unit types are found in the public sector. Where in the private sector, for example, only 39%
of the units have more than 60% women, public sector units are nearly twice as likely to have
a majority of women in the unit. In the private sector, units with 60% or more women have a
higher win rate than all-male units, while in the public sector the opposite is true.
Minority workers, however, are much more prevalent in private sector units. In the
private sector, 20% of the units have at least 60% minority workers, compared to less than
10% of the elections in the public sector. Units where at least 5% of workers have a language
other than English ,as their primary language are also much less common in the public sector,
averaging only 4% compared to 31% of private sector election campaigns. The presence of
minority workers in both sectors leads to a higher win rate, although the increase in win rates
is more dramatic in the private sector.
On average, the data show that wages of workers organizing in the public sector in our
sample are almost double the wages of workers in private industry. For both the private and
public sector, low-wage workers are more likely to organize. However, only 3% of the public
sector campaigns took place in)ow-wage units where the average wage was $5.00 or less an
hour. In combination with the pre-campaign health insurance and pension benefits, the wage
data demonstrate that public sector workers enter into organizing campaigns in considerably
better work situations than do their private sector counterparts. Organizing is also concen-
trated in very different units in the public sector than it is in the private sector. Fifty-nine
percent of private sector units are strictly blue collar, compared to 6% in the public sector.
15
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Private Sector Public Sector
Sample Proportion Sample Proportion
Proportion or Mean Proportion or Mean
or Mean for Wins % Win Rate or Mean for Wins % Win Rate
Percent of women in unit .46 .54 NA .60 .57 NA
Unit at least 60% female .39 .49 .53 (.36) .60 .54 .63(.81)
No women in unit .13 .14 .44 (.43) .01 .01 1.00 (.70)
Percent minority in unit .28 .34 NA .16 .17 NA
Unit at least 60% minority .20 .25 .53 (.40) .09 .09 .73 (.70)
No minorities in unit .23 .20 .37 (.44) .28 .27 .68 (.71)
Percent part-time in unit .06 .08 NA .15 .17 NA
0\ Average bargaining unit wage 6.31 5.72 NA 10.39 10.61 NA
Average wage $5.00 or less .41 .54 .56 (.33) .03 .03 .80 (.70)
Average unit age 32.77 31.78 NA 39.08 38.82 NA
5% or more of unit non-English speaking .31 .32 043 (.43) .04 .02 .43(.71)
Unit strictly clerical .03 .03 .38 (.43) .09 .11 .82 (.69)
Unit strictly blue collar .59 .55 .40 (.47) .06 .08 .91 (.69)
Unit service and maintenance .13 .18 .60 (.40) .38 .33 .61 (.76)
Unit technical/professional .02 .02 .40 (.43) .17 .17 .68(.71)
Unit Wall-to-Wall .08 .09 .45 (.42) .08 .09 .80 (.69)
Note: Number in parentheses lists the percent win rate when the characteristic or tactic did not occur.
Source: Bronfenbrennerand Juravich (1994).
TABLE 6
Bargaining-Unit Demographics in Private and Public Sector Certification Elections
Conversely, 38% of organizing in the public sector takes place in service and maintenance
units, compared to only 13% in the private sector.4
Perhaps the most dramatic difference in bargaining-unit demographics is that nearly a
third of public sector elections occurred in clerical, technical, or professional units while only
5% of the private sector campaigns took place in white-collar units. Whereas in the private
sector these units were associated with win rates of 40% or less, in the public sector unions
won 82% of the clerical elections and 68% of the technical and professional elections.
Overall, there is considerable variation in the demographics of the units that are cur-
rently being organized in the public and private sectors. Yet it is difficult to see how these
differences in wages, unit type, and the distribution of women and minorities would account
for the dramatic differences in win rates for the public and private sector. In fact, these
demographic differences would more likely lead to the opposite conclusion. This is espe-
cially true of the large number of public sector elections covering more highly paid profes-
sional workers including teachers, professors, engineers, court officers, health care profes-
sionals, and managers and administrators. However, there are many more public sector
elections for these workers, but, unlike in the private sector, where unions win only a handful
of elections in high wage technical and professional units, public sector unions win more than
two-thirds of the elections in these units.
Given the higher proportion of professional workers and higher average wages in the
public sector compared to the private sector, it would appear that public sector workers
would be significantly less motivated to join unions. Yet, as we have shown, this is not the
case. Over three quarters of public sector workers participate in voting for unionization, and
public sector unions receive over 80% of the vote on average. Clearly we need to identify
alternative explanations for the differences in win rates between the public and private
sectors.
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EMPLOYER TACTICS IN CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS
Many have argued that differences in employer behavior provide the most compelling
explanation for differences in union success in the public and private sector. However, to date
the only documentation of public sector employer behavior was based on the anecdotes
and experiences of organizers who had run public sector campaigns.
Table 7 presents the first detailed examination of tactics used by employers in both the
public and private sectors. The dramatic differences in employer behavior are apparent from
the data on the first line of the table. In almost a quarter of the elections in the public sector,
the employer did not campaign at all against the union. This means that in these elections
workers decided whether to vote for or against the union free from any interference from the
employer. No captive-audience meetings were held, no letters were mailed, no workers were
fired. In contrast, in the private sector there was not a single NLRB election where the em-
ployer did not run some kind of campaign against the union.
.
Looking first at illegal employer activity, six times as many workers were discharged
for union activity during NLRB election campaigns than in public sector campaigns. Workers
in the private sector were almost six times more likely to be fired and not reinstated before
the election than they were in the public sector. In the public sector this occurred in only 3%
of the cases, as opposed to 18% among private employers. Of special note here is that com-
plaints were issued on illegal discharges in 13% of elections in the private sector and in only
2% of state and local elections.
Similar patterns emerge in terms of other unfair-Iabor-practice charges. In addition to
discharges, unions filed other unfair labor practices in only 5% of the public sector elections,
compared to 22% of private sector elections. Unlike the private sector, where most of these
charges had to do with more egregious labor-law violations such as threats of discipline,
surveillance and intimidation of union supporters, and the funding and domination of anti-
union committees, in the public sector these additional charges related primarily to changes
in personnel policies and procedures. Although unions were able to win complaints in only
20% of the public sector campaigns where they filed additional charges, in many of the cases
they were able to reach a settlement with the employer outside of the labor-board process.
Reviewing the overall list of employer campaign tactics, virtually every tactic (with the
exception of media campaigns) is considerably more prevalent in the private sector than in
the public sector. For example, private sector employers used captive audience meetings 82%
of the time, while they were used in only 32% of the state and local government elections.
Private employers mailed letters in 80% of the certification elections, almost three times as
many elections as in the public sector. Similar patterns emerged in the distribution of com-
pany leaflets, with the private sector employing them five times as often.
Private Sector Public Sector
Sample Proportion Sample Proportion
Proportion or Mean Proportion or Mean
or Mean forWins % Win Rate or Mean for Wins % Win Rate
No employer campaign* .00 .00 0 (.43) .24 .24 .72 (.70)
Employer discharged workers for union activity .30 .35 .51 (.39) .05 .03 .44 (.72)
Complaints issued .13 .17 .58 (.40) .02 .02 .50 (.71)
Fired workers not reinstated before the election .18 .19 .37 (.44) .03 .02 .50(.71)
Other ULPs filed .22 .24 .47(.41) .05 .02 .38 (.72)
Complaints issued on other ULPs .14 .17 .51 (.41) .01 *** .00(.71)
Employer filed election objections .13 .27 .51 (.41) .04 .05 .75 (.70)
Employer used consultant .71 .67 .40 (.50) .48 046 .67 (.73)
Employer used layoffs .15 .18 .53(041) .08 .08 .71 (.70)
Anti-union committee used 042 .37 .37 (.46) .24 .21 .60 (.73)
\D Employer used captive audience meetings .82 .82 .43 (.42) .35 .32 .64 (.74)
Number of captive audience meetings 5.5 3.97 NA 2.12 1.87 NA
Employer mailed letters .80 .79 042(045) .35 .32 .63 (.74)
Number of employer letters 4047 3.93 NA 1.88 1.66 NA
Employer distributed leaflets .70 .70 043 (.42) .23 .21 .63 (.72)
Number of employer leaflets 5.98 5.41 NA 1.50 1.33 NA
Supervisors did one-on-one meetings .79 .79 043 (.42) AD 043 .76 (.66)
Employer used media .10 .13 .52 (041) .16 .17 .72 (.70)
Employer gave wage increase .30 .23 .32 (047) .12 .12 .71 (.70)
Employer promoted leaders .17 .19 047(042) .08 .07 .64 (.71)
Employer made promises .56 044 .34 (.54) .26 .25 .68 (.71)
Management change after petition .21 .20 041(.54) .09 .06 044(.73)
Employer campaign included more than 5 tactics** .38 .34 .39 (045) .07 .06 .54 (.71)
- - - -
TABLE 7
EmployerTactics Utilized in Private and Public Sector Certification Elections
Note: Number in parentheses lists the percent win rate when the characteristic or tactic did not occur.
*
Employer did none of the following: captive-audience meetings; anti-union committees; anti-union letters; anti-union leaflets; surervisor one-on-ones;
unscheduled wage increases during campaign; promises of improvements in wages, benefits, or working conditions; promotion of key union leaders; and
media campaigns.
**
Employer campaign included more than five of the tactics listed above.
***
The board ordered a second election, which the union won.
Source: Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1994).
Even in those campaigns where public sector employers utilized captive-audience
meetings and mailings and leaflets, it was of a very different character and intensity than in
the private sector. In most cases, public sector employers used letters, leaflets, and meetings
only once or twice during the campaign, while in the private sector four or five letters, leaf-
lets, and/or captive-audience meetings were the norm. Over and over again the public sector
organizers interviewed in the study reported that there was no..employer opposition whatso-
ever, or the opposition was limited to a few nonthreatening letters and meetings.
Public sector employers were also much less likely to use other tactics commonly
practiced by private sector employers, including supervisor one-on-ones; illegal wage in-
creases; promises of improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions in return for
opposition to the union; the promotion of union leaders to non-bargaining-unit positions; and
changes in first-line supervisors and middle or top management during the campaign.
Whereas in the private sector more than 70% of the employers used outsi1e consultants, in
the public sector outside consultants were brought in by employers in only 48% of the cam-
paigns, and were primarily utilized in a legal advisory capacity.
That is not to say that there were not some public sector employers who engaged in
more aggressive anti-union tactics such as discharges of union activists, threats of layoffs and
privatization, unit and election challenges, and a full-scale effort to discredit the union. As in
the private sector, unions found those actions very difficult to overcome. However, unlike the
private sector, where these kind of actions are the norm, the few public sector cases where
employers ran more intensive campaigns were clearly the exception andwere highly concen-
trated in higher education and health care. This is not surprising, given that public sector
higher education and health care employers are more insulated from public pressure than are
their counterparts in local and state government. They are also more closely aligned with
private sector institutions, such as hospital associations, than are other public sector employ-
ers. Similarly, the majority of the cases where state labor-relations boards issued complaints
for discharges and other unfair-labor-practice violations were in health care and higher
education units.
These few cases notwithstanding, the employer tactic data make clear that there is little
opposition to unions by state and local government employers. Indeed, the data illustrates
that in almost one quarter of the elections there is no campaign, and most of the remaining
campaigns are of extremely low intensity. This difference in intensity is best captured by the
employer-tactic scale presentedon the final row of Table 7. These data show that nearly 40%
of private sector employers, as compared to only 7% of public sector employers. utilize more
than five of the following tactics: captive-audience meetings, letters, leaflets, anti-union
committees, media campaigns, supervisor one-on-ones, discharges, wage increases, or pro-
motions of union leaders.
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nIn both the public and private sector, the intensity of the employer campaign was
associated with significantly lower union win rates. Unions won only 39% of the NLRB
campaigns where employers used more than five of the tactics, compared to 45% of the
elections where five or fewer tactics were used. In the public sector the union win rate was
54% where more than five tactics were used, and 71 % where five or fewer tactics were used.
However, because these more aggressive employer campaigns only occurred in 7% of the
elections in the public sector sample, they had a negligible effect on the overall union win
rate.s
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This pattern makes a great deal of sense given the fact that public officials are consider-
ably more accountable than are their private sector counterparts. A private employer may
engage in illegal tactics or push legal tactics to the absolute limit with few repercussions.
Indeed this kind of "bottom-line" hardball strategy may in fact garner support from their
peers, stockholders, and current and future investors.
In public sector elections in states with collective-bargaining legislation, very different
dynamics are in operation. Many public officials are elected and regardless of their individual
attitudes are constrained from engaging in activities that the public might perceive nega-
tively. Thus, public opinion acts as a leveling mechanism, creating a more level playing field
between labor and management. In addition, public sector workers enjoy constitutional free
speech and public access rights, and in some cases civil-service protection, denied to almost
every unorganized private sector worker. In contrast, as shown by the private sector data,
aggressive employer opposition in NLRB campaigns, coupled with bureaucratic delays and
weak enforcement of labor laws, has rendered the kind of organizing climate that exists in the
public sector impossible.
Some may argue that the differing nature and intensity of employer tactics in the public
and private sector is merely a reflection of differences between public and private sector
union organizing efforts. That is to say that public sector employers are less likely and less
able to mount aggressive anti-union campaigns because they are constrained by more aggres-
sive and effective union-organizing strategies. It is clear from both the public and private
sector data that this is not the case.
Additional analysis of union tactics in our sample suggests that public sector union
campaigns are significantly less intensive, rather than more intensive, than those in the
private sector. For a broad range of union tactics, such as building representative and active
organizing committees, conducting housecalls for a majority of the union, using solidarity
days, using rank-and-file volunteers from other units, and surveying workers one-an-one
regarding what they want in their first agreement, public sector campaigns are of equal or
lower intensity than private sector campaigns. For example, unions used organizing commit-
tees in 81% of public sector campaigns compared to 94% of private sector campaigns, with a
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mean committee size of 10% of the unit for both sectors. In both the public and private
sectors, organizers conducted home visits with the majority of the unit in 15% of the cases,
while they were twice as likely to use solidarity days in the private sector (12%) than in the
public sector (6%).
It is clear from our analysis that differences in union tactics alone cannot account for
the higher win rate in the public sector. Once again, the data point to employer behavior as
the primary reason for the dramatic difference between the 85% public sector union win rate
and the 48% private sector win rate.
I~ CONCLUSIONS
r
I
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This first detailed examination of public sector organizing provides some important
insights into our understanding of why workers win and lose certification elections. While
much of the literature has continued to focus on unfair-labor-practice data or anecdotal case
studies, the analysis of this new data provides a fresh perspective to the current debate on
. . .
umon orgamzmg.
, Most importantly, our examination of certification elections in the public sector demon-
strates that these workers, unlike their private sector counterparts, are enthusiastically partici-
pating in union elections and voting for unions in large numbers. This calls into question the
portrait of American workers as being no longer interested in unions. The comparison of
detailed information on public and private certification elections has provided us an excellent
opportunity to reformulate the debate.
We have examined a number of alternative explanations for the dramatic differences in
the win rates in public and private sector elections. While there are differences in employer
characteristics, labor-board practices and procedures, bargaining-unit demographics, and
union tactics, none of these differences account for the variation in win rates.
Our data indicate, however, that the low private sector win rate is largely a consequence
of significantly higher employer opposition. In the public sector nearly one quarter of the
employers do not mount any campaign at all against the union. Even in those cases where
public sector employers do oppose the union effort, most of the employer campaigns are
limited to a few legal actions of extremely low intensity. This contrasts sharply with the
private sector, where the overwhelming majority of employers launch aggressive anti-union
campaigns both in the workplace and in the broader community.
As we have ~uggested, in the 35 states with collective-bargaining legislation, the public
accountability of government officials acts to discourage the aggressive kind of anti-union
behavior that has become so commonplace in the private sector.6 We concur with others that
the playing field has become unduly tilted toward management in the past decade, violating
the spirit and intention of the National Labor Relations Act. In many ways, the kind of labor-
management climate that we found so prevalent in public sector organizing, where workers
choose unions in an environment free from coercion, intimidation, and manipulation, is much
closer to what the framers of the NLRA intended.
Given the absence of any effective constraints on employer behavior in the private
sector, the only way to reproduce the more level playing field that predominates in the public
sector is through significant expansion of both worker and union rights and employer penal-
ties in the organizing process. This will require not only more vigorous and rapid enforce-
ment of current laws but also serious financial penalties and injunctive relief to restrain the
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most egregious employer violations. It will also require the expansion of union access rights
to the workplace in order to counteract the captive and coercive nature of employer commu-
nication with workers during the organizing campaign.7
Without comprehensive labor-law reform, private sector workers will continue to be
denied the opportunity to organize promised them by Section 7 of the NLRA. The brutal and
contentious organizingclimate found by the Commissionon tpe Future of Worker-Manage-
ment Relations will continue unabated. Our study of public sector organizing shows that an
alternative organizing environment, where workers can choose whether or not to belong to a
union without being subjected to coercion, intimidation, lies, and false promises, is possible
for the private sector if aggressive employer opposition can be constrained.
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ENDNOTES
I~
1. Studies that utilize more detailed unit breakdowns than NLRB classifications have
found greater variation between units, ranging from lows of 30% for professional and techni-
cal units to 60% for service and maintenance (Bronfenbrenner 1993,46-48; Deshpande and
Fiorito 1989).
2. This may in part be a function of a technical problem with the way that ULP data is
reported by the NLRB. Based on its coding scheme, there is no easy way to separate the
ULPs relating to certification elections from those related to contract administration and the
collective-bargaining process.
r
r
I 3. The final sample was reduced to 235 cases after we received information from organiz-
ers in 15 campaigns that the state labor-relations agencies had incorrectly recorded their
election as a single union certification election when it was, in fact, a decertification, accre-
tion, severance, or multi-union election.
4. This is not a perfect comparison because service and maintenance units in the public
sector are often incorporated into larger nonprofessional or support staff units that include
some clerical and blue-collar workers along with the service and maintenance workers.
I
I;
I;
I
~
5. Our logit and regression analysis of the private sector data found that the majority of
employer tactics had a statistically significant negative impact on both percent union vote and
election outcome when the influence of election environment, company and union character-
istic, and union tactic and characteristic variables were controlled for (Bronfenbrenner 1994).
Due to the extremely small number of campaigns in which public sector employers used
these tactics, we found a similar regression analysis to be neither feaseable nor appropriate in
the public sector.
6. Our analysis and conclusions do not apply to the 15 states that do not have any collec-
tive-bargaining legislation covering state and/or local employees.
7. Given the dr~matiCpolitical changes that are currently taking place in state and local
governments, many public sector employers may feel free to take on a more aggressive anti-
union stance similar to that of the city administrations of New York and Philadelphia. There-
fore, in order to protect against any erosion of worker and union rights in the public sector,
many of the policy changes we recommend for the private sector may need to be incorpo-
rated into state and local labor laws.
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